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UNION WITH GOD: A THEORY 
Robert Oakes 
The experience of "union with God," i.e., experience the phenomenological 
core of which can be expressed as dissolution-of-self-in-God, arguably con-
stitutes the most spiritually significant sort of religious experience. However, 
it is well-known that canonical theistic metaphysics-by virtue of its (anti-
pantheistic) insistence upon an unbridgeable bifurcation between Creator and 
creature-rules out the literal veridicality of such experience. Alternatively, 
whatever the phenomenological significance of "unitive" religious experi-
ence, traditional theism must deny that there can occur literal or ontological 
mergings of finite selves with God. Our purpose is to construct the rudiments 
of a theory designed to establish that classical theism is perfectly compatible 
with the view that "unitive" religious experience has serious ontological 
import; moreover, our proposal has the "practical" advantage of accounting 
well for the profound conviction among the phenomenological subjects of 
such experience of having "become one" with God. 
The long-standing question of how (let alone whether) putative apprehensions 
of God's presence can justifiably be regarded as veridical by their phenom-
enological subjects arguably constitutes the preeminent and most vexatious 
item on the agenda of the epistemology of theistic religious experience. 
Elsewhere) I attempted to establish the spuriousness-or unacceptably ten-
dentious character-of the prevalent rejection of the thesis that there can 
occur veridical experience of God's presence with the epistemic distinction 
of authenticating itself to its phenomenological SUbjects. Specifically, my 
purpose was to establish that we are well within our intellectual rights to 
regard the idea of self-authenticating religious experience, whatever other 
objections it might plausibly be heir to (e.g., its epistemic eccentricity), as 
conceptually acceptable. 
However, it is clear that there are other serious issues confronting the 
epistemologist of theistic 'mysticism,' and, in what follows, our attention will 
focus on one of them. Specifically, we will explore and attempt to ameliorate 
the difficulty that has traditionally been held to block the legitimacy of 
viewing as veridical any cases of what might plausibly be regarded as the 
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most spiritually profound sort of religious experience: namely, the experience 
of union with God. 
I 
To begin with, while it would be hyperbolic to suggest that the phenome-
nological core of all experience of 'oneness' or 'spiritual unification' with 
God consists in the obliteration of self, it seems fair to claim that the dominant 
or most pervasive 'unitive' state reported by theistic mystics has as its dis-
tinguishing phenomenological feature dissolution-of-self-in-God. 2 (In what 
follows, I shall use 'dsGe' for the awkwardly lengthy 'dissolution-of-self-in-
God experience'). Accordingly, what is tellingly central to dsGe is the sense 
of merging with God to the extent that the relevant finite self as a distinct 
locus of consciousness is annihilated. On the assumption that philosophers 
interested in the present topic are familiar with the tradition of 'unitive' 
mysticism, it would clearly be gratuitous to engage in extensive citation from 
its many representatives. Rather, I suggest that more than ample backdrop 
for what is to follow is provided by brief reference to the distinguished 
Flemish mystic Jan van Ruysbroeck and the reproduction of a few passages 
from our contemporary, Thomas Merton. It seems to me that the passages 
from Merton constitute conspicuously paradigmatic and especially lyrical 
descriptions of dsGe. 
In Chapter XII of The Book of Supreme Truth (,Of the Highest Union, 
Without Difference or Distinction '), Ruysbroeck characterizes the 'union 
without distinction' as one in which 'all uplifted spirits are melted and 
noughted in the Essence of God.' Merton appears to lend serious endorsement 
to this characterization: 
... where contemplation becomes what it is really meant to be, it is no longer 
something infused by God into a created subject, so much as God living in 
God and identifying a created life with His own life so that there is nothing 
left of any significance but God living in God.3 
Alternatively, 
Here is a man who is dead and buried and gone ... So it is with one who has 
vanished into God by pure contemplation. God alone is left.4 
Accordingly, 
As long as there is an T that is the definite subject of a contemplative 
experience, an I that is aware of itself and of its contemplation ... we have not 
yet passed over the Red Sea ... s 
Hence it can properly be inferred that for any veridical case of dsGe (if such 
there can be-more immediately to follow on this), what would happen to 
the relevant finite self would be remarkably similar to what happens to sugar 
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when placed in hot water, or to gold when placed in aqua regia: i.e., 'unitive' 
mysticism gives compelling indication of entailing that finite selves are-in 
a perfectly straightforward sense-God-soluble. That is, given the requisite 
conditions (about which more later on), finite selves dissolve into God, or, 
as it is often expressed, are absorbed into God. 6 
As has long been recognized, there is a clear sense in which the tenets of 
canonical theism preclude the occurrence of literally veridical cases of dsGe. 
For it is nonnegotiably central to theistic orthodoxy that, no matter how 
intimate or close an association one may manage to develop with God, there 
obtains an unbridgeable metaphysical gulf between Creator and creature, and, 
accordingly, between Infinite Self and finite selves. Hence, while the doctrine 
of 'unitive' or 'absorptive' mysticism is conceptually harmonious with the 
largely monistic or nontheistic metaphysics of Eastern belief-systems such 
as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism, it seems unimpeachable that classical 
Western monotheism cannot but preclude the literal dissolution of finite 
selves in God to the extent that 'God alone is left.' Rather, since any such 
view patently entails (the pantheistic heterodoxy) that the unbridgeable meta-
physical chasm between God and creature can completely be traversed, i.e., 
that creatures can literally merge with their Creator, it cannot but collide with 
a central component of normative Judeo-Christian theism.' 
As a somewhat ancillary, but, I suggest, worthwhile observation in this 
regard, it seems eminently difficult to deny that, quite independently of the-
istic metaphysics, there is something conceptually odd about the notion that 
persons can be in the epistemic position of detecting the nonexistence of 
themselves as distinct centers of consciousness. Consider: while there 
could-for all we know-occur ontological/literal dissolution-of-self in some 
all-encompassing 'Absolute' (as held, for example, in monistic or Vedantic 
Hinduism), it seems clear that no such event could ever be experienced by 
the relevant finite selves. Surely, for any finite self S, the state of affairs 
consisting in the nonexistence of S (qua distinct center of consciousness) is 
not a state of affairs the obtaining of which is detectable by S, since such 
entails that S can have (per impossible) a veridical experience of the nonex-
istence of that whose existence constitutes a conceptually necessary condition 
for S's having any experiences at all. This is not to deny that one could 
veridic ally experience himself/herself as 'contracting' or 'diminishing' as a 
distinct existent (whatever such 'experience' might come to) with the pro-
found sense that this occurrence in some way reflects God's will. Such, 
however, is radically different from the contention that one can veridically 
experience himself/herself as no longer existing as a distinct center of con-
sciousness. Accordingly, the idea that there can occur literally veridical cases 
of dsGe is not only inconsistent with traditional theistic metaphysics, but 
168 Faith and Philosophy 
gives compelling indication of being self-inconsistent as well. Needless to 
say that this amounts to powerful justification for rejecting it. 
II 
Shall we accede, then, to the long-standing and prevailing view that one 
cannot properly or with consistency both subscribe to traditional theistic 
metaphysics and maintain that the experiences of unitive or absorptive mys-
tics can have significant ontological import? It seems to me that we would 
do well to resist any temptation to do so. In what follows, we will proffer the 
rudiments of a theory designed to establish that, notwithstanding the preclu-
sion by canonical theism of literally veridical cases of dsGe, such experience 
can have major metaphysical import, i.e., can without in any way compro-
mising the inviolability of the Creator-creature bifurcation so central to ca-
nonical theism, properly be held to mark a significant sort of ontological 
union between the relevant finite selves and God. 
To begin with, it seems incontestable that, necessarily, experiential know-
ing8-i.e., cognition that is perceptual in character-incorporates an element 
of receptivity or passivity. While there is much on which epistemologists of 
perception continue to disagree concerning the precise nature of that process 
by which persons come to acquire 'empirical knowledge,' it seems intuitively 
evident that part of what it is to have an experience (and I place strong 
emphasis upon the word 'part') is to be-presented-to in some way or other.9 
Let it be clear that this is in no way intended to diminish the significance of 
the conceptual, classificatory, or ordering role of mind in the experiential 
process. Rather, it is simply to observe that, notwithstanding the interpretive, 
i.e., property-ascribing, role of mind in making our experience fully intelli-
gible to us, nothing could count as a case of perceptual knowing if it failed 
to involve an element which, in the still telling formulation of C. I. Lewis, 
'we do not create by thinking and cannot, in general, displace or alter.10 Of 
course a number of epistemologists have argued that sensory presentations 
have no determinate phenomenological content independently of being con-
ceptualized in some way by their epistemic subjects. While it seems to me 
that there are compelling arguments against this view,! 1 the point to be 
stressed is that nothing in our thesis necessitates a quarrel with it. Accord-
ingly, I am perfectly prepared to allow (what I am convinced is mistaken) 
that sensory presentations cannot be at all intelligible to their epistemic 
subjects independently of conceptualization. 
Moreover, it should also be clear that nothing in the foregoing entails the 
traditional doctrine-with which it has all too often been conflated or asso-
ciated-that 'privileged representations' constitute the roots of our empirical 
noetic structure. 12 Alternatively, nothing in our preceding discussion commits 
us to any version of the view that empirical knowledge rests upon epistemi-
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cally privileged apprehensions, and, indeed, it is easy to see why. As just 
noted, that perceptual cognition is partially receptive or passive in character 
in no way entails that there can be unconceptualized sensory presentations 
with determinate phenomenological content. Hence, that perceptual cognition 
is partially receptive or passive is perfectly compatible with the view that no 
intelligible sensory presentations could fail to be unconceptualized. But 
where there is conceptualization, there is (of course) property-ascription and 
belief. Hence, nothing that has been urged thus far precludes its being the 
case that our awareness of what is 'presented' to us in the course of perceptual 
cognition involves inference; however, if inference is requisite for the acqui-
sition of empirical knowledge, the possibility of error cannot be ruled out. 
Accordingly, our preceding observations are perfectly compatible with the 
thesis that no intelligible perceptual apprehensions are ever epistemically 
privileged or incorrigible in character. 
III 
Given the soundness of the foregoing, there seems to be excellent justifi-
cation for adopting-albeit with the important qualification specified 
below-the time-honored epistemic bifurcation formulated by Aristotle and 
subscribed to by, among many other distinguished philosophers in the Aris-
totelian tradition, Maimonides and St. Thomas: namely, the distinction be-
tween 'active intellect' and 'passive intellect.' Now the important 
qualification alluded to above is that our adoption of this traditional division 
in no way commits us to a 'faculty' rather than a 'modal' psychology; rather, 
our use of the adjectives 'active' and 'passive' is intended to designate as-
pects of intellect rather than kinds of intellect. Accordingly, our use of 'pas-
sive intellect' in the sequel constitutes a shorthand for 'the purely receptive 
or being-presented-to aspect of perceptual cognition.' 
Now it seems clear that the passive intellect is, roughly, the psychologi-
cal/epistemic analogue of Plato's Receptacle. Just as the latter, by virtue of 
its inherent formlessness, is suited to take on or receive (the exemplifications 
of) 'all forms,' so the passive intellect, by virtue of its inherent formlessness, 
i.e., its status as a pure epistemic-potentiality (to be perfectly Aristotelian 
about it) is perfectly suited to take on or receive-is absolutely open to-an 
indefinite number of phenomenological configurations. Since, once again like 
Plato's Receptacle, the passive intellect lacks any positive character, there is 
no self-consistent arrangement of phenomenological properties with which it 
is incompatible. Following tradition-not out of any special deference to its 
formulations but because I find it very difficult to improve upon tradition in 
this regard-let us say that the phenomenological content which we simply 
receive in the course of perceptual cognition (whether or not any feature of 
such content is discriminable by us independently of conceptualization) con-
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stitutes the actualization of the passive intellect. Hence, the passive intellect, 
as a purely receptive capacity, becomes literally or numerically identical to, 
i.e., simply becomes, for whatever duration is involved, the phenomenologi-
cal content that constitutes its actualization for that span of time. Alterna-
tively, the phenomenological configuration that constitutes its actualization 
for some given duration just is the entire nature of the passive intellect for 
that duration. Accordingly, for any possible phenomenological configuration 
PC, the inherent phenomenological neutrality of the passive intellect ensures 
its capacity to become PC. 
Now, of course, lest we countenance a crude corpuscular account of percep-
tion, passive intellects cannot become numerically identical to the material 
objects an-sich that we apprehend in the course of normal perceptual cogni-
tion. That is, while it might be tempting to claim that, in cases of veridical 
perception, there obtains 'an identity' between the phenomenological content 
that constitutes the actualization of the passive intellects of the relevant per-
ceivers and the objects of their perceptual cognition, it seems clear that the 
'identity' in question must be qualitative rather than numerical. Aristotle con-
veys this point with special crispness in Book III of De Anima (424a)Y 
By a 'sense' is meant what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible 
forms of things without the matter ... The way in which a piece of wax takes 
on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or gold ... 
Accordingly, veridical perception of physical objects implies a (or something 
close to a) qualitative rather than numerical identity between that which the 
passive intellect becomes and the physical ding-an-sich. As pointed out by 
W. D. Ross in his exposition of Aristotle on this point, 
The sensitive faculty becomes its objects in the sense that their form is 
conveyed over to the sensitive subject and becomes the whole nature, for the 
time being, of the sensitive subject ... 14 
Moreover, Aristotle insists just a bit further on (431 b) that it is impossible 
that 'the things themselves' -in contradistinction to 'their forms' -be 'pres-
ent in the soul. • 
Aristotle's observations in this regard have, or so it seems to me, an air of 
unimpeachability.15 When, for example, someone has veridical awareness of 
her car, her passive intellect does not (cannot) literally become the car-an-
sich. Rather, and notwithstanding that attempts to provide a convincing rig-
orous definition of 'veridical perception' may well border on the quixotic, 
this much seems incontestable: veridicality involves a qualitative approxima-
tion (if not identity) between some perceiver's phenomenological content and 
the (surface of the) material object that (partially) explains the occurrence of 
that phenomenological content. Accordingly, nothing said here should be 
taken as in any way tantamount to, or implying, a defense of classical rep-
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resentationalism. For it in no way commits us to the thesis that the referential 
or ontological reach of perceptual experience is limited to mental entities 
such as 'ideas' or 'sense-data,' Le., that perceptual awareness inevitably 
terminates upon something short of material things as such. Rather, the re-
jection of an untenably crude corpuscular account of perception does not 
require that the chunks of matter which constitute the (at least partial) causes 
of our veridical perceptual apprehensions are not the direct objects of such 
apprehensions. Accordingly, subscribing to some version of direct realism in 
no way commits one to the untenable notion that, in the course of veridical 
perceptual awareness, the passive intellect-i.e., the purely receptive aspect 
of experiential cognition-literally turns into the external material object 
an-sich of which the relevant perceiver has direct awareness. 
IV 
It is time to return to our central concern by way of the question which by 
now is virtually clamoring to be answered: namely, what is the significance 
of the foregoing epistemological exploration for the thesis that we hope to 
secure? How does it bear upon our proposal that traditional theistic meta-
physics-notwithstanding its preclusion of literally veridical cases of dsGe-
allows for a significant sort of ontological union between finite selves and 
God? Initially, it might be difficult to see how our epistemological prelude 
can be of any serious value to us in this regard. Indeed, one might argue that 
it counts strongly against the contention that dsGe can have major metaphys-
ical import. That is, we have focussed on the seemingly incontestable point-
as stressed by Aristotle and many other distinguished thinkers-that in the 
course of ,experiential cognition, the passive intellect can become (at best) 
qualitatively but never numerically identical with the particulars of ordinary 
perceptual apprehension. 
This notwithstanding, however, we are now positioned to see that our 
foregoing epistemological exploration is an indispensable basis for establish-
ing that which is absolutely pivotal for the success or our project. Specific-
ally, it permits us to see that God constitutes a distinct exception to the rule 
that limits the passive intellect to (just) qualitative identity with the objects 
of experiential cognition. Rather, there is compelling warrant for maintaining 
that there can occur veridical perceptual awareness of God l6 in which the 
passive intellect of the relevant finite selves would become numerically iden-
tical with the object of their veridical perceptual awareness-Le., numerically 
identical with God as such. But how so? How can it be that, while the passive 
intellect is precluded from becoming numerically identical to material objects 
(as such)-in contradistinction to the perceptible form of such objects-it is 
not precluded from becoming numerically identical with God? 
The answer is this: the all-important difference between the particulars 
172 Faith and Philosophy 
apprehended by the external senses and the Particular Who is God, i.e., the 
difference that allows for cases of veridical detection of God/God's Presence 
in which there occurred numerical (rather than just qualitative) identity be-
tween that which constituted the actualization of the passive intellect and 
God as such, is that-in contradistinction to all of those things apprehended 
via the external senses-God is incorporeal,17 indeed essentially so. Accord-
ingly, God necessarily lacks perceptible form. Consequently, it is transparent 
that no case of veridical perceptual detection of God could possibly be such 
that the relevant passive intellect was actualized by-had 'as its entire nature' 
during the course of the experience in question-God's 'perceptible form.' 
This being clear, the proper conclusion would seem to be this: in any case in 
which God was veridically experienced nonsuperveniently,i8 that which con-
stituted the actualization of the relevant passive intellect would be nothing 
short of God as such. For it is the corporeality of corporeal particulars that 
limits the passive intellect to (at best) qualitative identity-in, of course, 
cases of veridical perception-with material objects. Alternatively, it is the 
corporeality of corporeal particulars that limits the passive intellect to (at 
best) numerical identity-in, of course, cases of veridical perception-with 
the perceptible form of material objects. Accordingly, it is God's (essential) 
incorporeality that ensures the absence of any such limitation. 
Now to stress the obvious for just a moment, the passive intellect-as one 
aspect of the self-in no way exhausts the self. Clearly, there is considerably 
more to the self than passive intellect, just as there is considerably more to 
the self than memory, or than imagination: obviously the self (however ana-
lyzed) does not reduce to anyone of its aspects. Accordingly, while (if our 
argumentation thus far is sound) any veridical case of nonsupervenient expe-
rience of God would be such that the 'entire nature' of the relevant passive 
intellect would be exhausted by God, the failure of the passive intellect to 
exhaust the entire nature of the self ensures that no veridical case of non-
supervenient experience of God would involve God's exhaustion of the self 
in its entirety. Alternatively, while passive intellects are thus amenable to 
literal absorption by God, this in no way permits the conclusion that finite 
selves en toto are amenable to literal absorption by God. Moreover, any such 
conclusion could not but spell disaster for our thesis by virtue of violating 
the central theistic tenet that there obtains an unbridgeable metaphysical 
bifurcation between Creator and creature. 
Now it has long been recognized that an important 'pragmatic' test of the 
strength or the adequacy of a theory is its explanatory or illuminative power 
vis-a-vis the data or phenomena that inspired the theory in the first place. 
With regard to our present theory, what we are seeking to illuminate is the 
phenomenology of 'absorptive unity,' i.e., to account satisfactorily for the 
compelling sensation of 'dissolution-of-self-in God' without in any way com-
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promising the unbridgeable duality between Creator and creature that lies at 
the heart of traditional theistic doctrine. Of course, questions of veridicality 
aside, it is well-known that persons who undergo such experience tend to be 
psychologically certain of its veridicality; indeed, many have spoken of the 
'self-authenticating' character of dsGe. Accordingly, notwithstanding what 
we have seen to be the decisive warrant for denying that there can occur 
literally veridical cases of dsGe, our theory cannot succeed if it fails to 
account satisfactorily for the extraordinarily powerful conviction of literal 
veridicality that attends experience of this sort. 
Hence, we have the following important question to consider: can the com-
pelling sense of 'oneness' with God adequately be explained by what would 
be (given the success of our argument thus far) the numerical or ontological 
identity that would obtain between God and the passive intellect in any verid-
ical case of nonsupervenient experience of God? Well, perhaps so. After all, 
one cannot but suspect that there would be something phenomenologically 
overwhelming about having one's passive intellect absorbed by nothing short 
of God. Accordingly, while it seems clear that traditional theism precludes the 
literal absorption of the entire self by God, it might well be plausible to 
maintain that the overpowering conviction of such absorption would amply be 
accounted for by the literal merger of the passive intellect with God that would 
obtain in any veridical case of nonsupervenient experience of God. 
However, it seems clear that we cannot leave it at just that. For if we do, 
we can anticipate some legitimate concern as to whether the promise of our 
thesis has been fulfilled. Our contention, we recall, was that dsGe can, with-
out in any way compromising the irreducible Creator-creature bifurcation that 
is so central to canonical theism, properly be held to mark a significant sort 
of ontological union between God and the relevant finite selves, i.e., with the 
relevant finite selves in their entirety-not simply with the single aspect of 
those selves that constitutes the passive intellect. Our remaining question, 
then, becomes the following: granted that any veridical case of nonsuperveni-
ent experience of God would be one in which the passive intellect of the 
relevant finite self would be literally merged with God, how can we get from 
that to the conclusion-given that finite selves in their entirety cannot liter-
ally dissolve in God-that the relevant finite self in its entirety would be in 
a condition of significant ontological union with God? Exactly what sort of 
'union' would this be? 
Intriguingly, we will see that in answering this question, considerable 
strength will be added to the ability of our theory to explain the intensity of 
the conviction of those who undergo such experience that, during the course 
of dsGe, the entire self becomes literally unified with God. Consider: it is 
misguided to suppose that all metaphysical unification or coming-together 
must be absorptive or exhaustive in character, i.e., must be such that one of 
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the components involved in the unification loses its distinctive or separate 
nature. Rather, there can occur a sort of merger between distinct realities that 
can properly be termed conjunctive in the sense that, while a real or ontolog-
ical linkage occurs, neither of the entities involved surrenders its distinctive 
nature. Perhaps the clearest paradigm available to us of such conjunctive 
unity is provided by the Cartesian conception of human persons. In the Sixth 
Meditation, Descartes states: 
Nature ... teaches me ... that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a 
vessel, but that I am very closely united to it, and so to speak so intenningled 
with it that I seem to compose with it one whole. 19 
One need not endorse Descartes' conception of persons-standardly, of 
course, called 'mind-body dualism' -in order to appreciate that the sort of 
mind-body unification central to that conception, while extraordinarily inti-
mate, is by no means absorptive. Minds and bodies are radically distinct in 
nature, and their unification by no means involves a dissolution of either of 
these substances into the other. This notwithstanding, however, we are 
'lodged' in our bodies much more strongly than is a pilot in his vessel; indeed, 
the connection between mind and body (according to the Cartesian account) 
is so strong that we do not feel separate or distinct from our bodies. Hence, 
while the actual unification of mind with body is strictly conjunctive rather 
than absorptive, the phenomenological situation-i.e., what seems to us to be 
the case-is that we 'compose with it one whole.' 
Here, I suggest, we have the ideal model for understanding the sort of 
ontological union that would occur between a finite self (in its entirety) and 
God in any case wherein this same finite self had veridical nonsupervenient 
experience of God, and, accordingly, wherein there obtained literal or numer-
ical identity between God and the passive intellect of that finite self. Since 
there is an undeniably essential connection between the self and all of its 
aspects, any case in which some passive intellect was literally exhausted or 
absorbed by God would, ipso facto, constitute a case in which it becomes 
eminently proper to regard God and the relevant finite self in its entirety as 
being in conjunctive (hence nonabsorptive) unity. Moreover, viewing any 
such case as one wherein the relevant finite self en toto would be in conjunc-
tive unity with God has the considerable merit of doing full justice to the 
compelling phenomenology of absorptive unity without in any way compro-
mising the metaphysical distance between Creator and creature that is non-
negotiably central to classical theism. While theistic metaphysics (and, as we 
have seen, conceptual considerations that are independent of theistic doc-
trine) ensure that finite selves cannot literally dissolve into God, the situation 
of conjunctive unity that can properly be held to obtain in any veridical case 
of nonsupervenient experience of God permits us to be more sympathetic than 
we might otherwise be to the absorptive mystic's conviction that her entire 
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self has merged with God to the extent that 'God alone is left.' For in any 
such case, the absorptive mystic would be so closely united to God that it 
could not but seem to her that she and God composed 'one whole. '20 
University of Missouri-Rolla 
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